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Incomplete Dispositions
Naomi Cahn*
Abstract
In Irresolute Testators, Professor Jane Baron provocatively
suggests the existence of two distinct types of testators: the
rational, autonomous testator who has made deliberate choices
about the contents of her will and whose errors, if any, are minor;
and the more vulnerable, less resolute testator who may not have
actually made the final decisions enshrined in a formal will. To
illustrate how these testators appear in wills law, she analyzes
how courts apply the doctrines of harmless error and mistake
reformation. While the two doctrines appear to be intended to help
the resolute testator, courts instead, she suggests, also apply the
doctrines to help the irresolute testator. In causing us to reflect on
the distinctions between dispository intent and a formal writing
recognizable as a final statement, on rational and boundedly
rational testators, on final and almost-final declarations, her
article focuses us on the art of line-drawing in wills law. In this
commentary, I explore another context that similarly raises issues
about testators whose final intent is not clearly expressed: when
can a disappointed beneficiary sue the drafting attorney for
malpractice? The doctrine of privity confronts the spectre of the
irresolute or inconclusive testator, yet courts have developed some
dividing lines that differ from those they have developed
surrounding harmless error. Privity seems to offer another
illustration of how bright-line rules do not necessarily achieve
dispository intent, although the privity rules do achieve certainty
on only allowing final dispository statements (that are incomplete
or show a lack of resolution) to provide a basis for a malpractice
action. This commentary applauds Professor Baron’s achievement
in focusing us on the limits of the wills reform doctrines and the
significance of accounting for different types of testators.
* Harold H. Greene Professor of Law, George Washington University
Law School. Thanks to Jane Baron for her engagement with this comment.
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In Irresolute Testators,1 Professor Baron raises a series of
fascinating issues about seemingly progressive developments in
wills law. I am honored to have this opportunity to respond to her
masterful, thoughtful, and thought-provoking article. Irresolute
Testators adds a much-needed—and contrary—layer to the
conventional story of wills reform doctrine, providing an analysis
of relevant statutory interpretation and court decisions. In doing
so, it tells numerous complex stories that explore the more
fundamental constraints on potential changes to wills doctrine
and builds on Professor Baron’s extraordinary earlier works.2
Reformers, scholars, and practitioners both within and outside of
the trusts and estates field can learn much from this rich and
detailed account of the possibilities and limits of reforming wills
law.
First, she suggests that the movement of progress in wills
doctrine—exemplified by the developments of substantial
compliance, mistake, and harmless error—do not, theoretically,
go quite as far as courts have taken the doctrines in practice.
These reforms, codified in statutes and written in the
Restatement, are designed to complement the goals of the Wills
Act, that is, recognition of a reliable writing3 that represents the
decedent’s “finalized testamentary intent”4 created by the
rational testator. They seek to assess whether the alleged writing
sought to be probated is, in fact, a “will”5 by excusing fairly
1. Jane B. Baron, Irresolute Testators, Clear and Convincing Wills Law,
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (2016).
2. E.g., Jane B. Baron, Empathy, Subjectivity, and Testamentary
Capacity, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043, 1055 (1987) (discussing the “insane
delusion” principle in wills law); Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64
IND. LJ. 155, 202 (1989) (describing wills law as anachronistic); Jane B. Baron,
Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 268 (1994) (noting the importance
of storytelling in critiquing objectivity).
3. The definition of a writing is, actually, ambiguous. See, e.g., NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 132.119, 136.185 (allowing for electronic wills) (2016); In re Estate
of Javier Castro, No. 2013ES00140 (Lorain Cnty. Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 19,
2013) (permitting probate of an electronic will pursuant to the Ohio version of
the harmless error rule—OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.24 (2016)); Anthony R. La
Ratta & Melissa B. Osorio, What’s in A Name? Writings Intended As Wills, 28
PROB. & PROP. 47, 50 (2014) (“The type of writing necessary to create a valid will
is evolving.”).
4. Baron, supra note 1, at 8.
5. “[T]he will execution reform permits investigation of a testator’s intent
that a document serve as a will, not the testator’s dispositive intent.” Baron,
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technical requirements. Accordingly, the article focuses on
whether the heightened evidentiary standard of proving defects
by clear and convincing evidence actually serves as the limit the
drafters anticipated on use of the reform doctrines.6
This leads to a second, and related, point: she draws a
distinction between whether a document is, indeed, a will rather
than simply an expression of the decedent’s intent for what
should, eventually, be included in a will.7 The reforms are
designed to address the decedent’s “fixed intent, and address only
the problem of inadvertent errors in setting out those wishes.”8
In interpreting the reform doctrines, she argues, courts may “find
it difficult to stay within the limits” contemplated by the
reforms.9 Instead, they inquire into whether the writing
establishes the decedent’s intent, even though the writings’
noncompliance with conventional Wills Act rules goes far beyond
the technical problems and—under appropriate interpretation of
the savings doctrines—might not actually qualify as wills.
Finally, and most critically, she suggests that wills law faces
an inherent contradiction: it posits a rational testator who is
protected by the reform doctrines, but the law also recognizes the
existence of a more emotionally vulnerable, less definitive
testator who is not explicitly protected by the reforms, and whom
supra note 1, at 39.
6. Baron’s article notes that some courts do apply the clear and convincing
standard in the manner seemingly intended by the reformers, but other courts
have had various problems, such as uncertainty as to the precise meaning of the
standard or whether clear and convincing evidence of the decedent’s dispository
intent—rather than that the decedent intended a particular document to be a
will—is adequate to satisfy the doctrines. Baron, supra note 1, at 8–27. For an
alternative critique of these doctrines, see Reid Kress Weisbord, The Advisory
Function of Law, 90 TUL. L. REV. 129, 184 (2015) (noting the expense of
establishing error). Interestingly, although there was concern that “a flood of
litigation” might result from adoption of the harmless error standard, an
empirical sample of California cases found none that involved the issue. Thomas
E. Simmons, Wills Above Ground, 23 ELDER L.J. 343, 362 (2016).
7. Mark Glover argues that conventional Wills Act doctrine is risk-averse
to probating an inauthentic will and results in false-negative outcomes that
prevent genuine wills from being probated. See Mark Glover, Minimizing
Probate-Error Risk, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 335–404 (2016) (concluding that
“the conventional law heavily allocates risk in favor of false-negative outcomes,
and does not minimize the overall risk of probate errors”).
8. Baron, supra note 1, at 68.
9. Id. at 69.
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courts often find sympathetic.10 She argues that the reform
doctrines do not adequately resolve the tensions between these
two different testators.
In identifying different images of testators, Professor Baron
has uncovered discords that are, as she suggests, fundamental to
contemporary wills law. While traditional probate law would
never validate a document that was everything-but-a-will in
terms of formalities—or would not reform a document that
mislabeled a beneficiary—the modern reform doctrines have,
perhaps inadvertently, permitted courts to give effect to such a
document or a bequest.
By causing us to reflect on the distinctions between
dispository intent and a formal writing recognizable as a final
statement—on rational and boundedly rational testators as well
as on final and almost-final declarations—Baron’s article
brilliantly focuses us on the art and craft of line-drawing in wills
law. She notes some of the other areas in which line-drawing
proves to be a challenge, and I briefly want to comment on
another context that provides an example of both safe harbors
and individualized decision-making, yet similarly raises issues
about testators whose final intent is not clearly expressed: When
can a disappointed beneficiary sue the drafting attorney for
malpractice?
The doctrine of privity confronts the spectre of the irresolute
or inconclusive testator, yet courts have developed some dividing
lines that differ from those they have developed surrounding
harmless error. This area may exemplify the approach that Baron
suggests the reform doctrines are designed to provide, and it
shows the promises and limits of clear rules.11 Privity seems to
10. Professor Baron points out the gendered nature of this language and
explicitly uses “the male pronoun throughout [her] article to avoid any
suggestion that male testators are resolute and female testators irresolute.” Id.
at 5 n.1.
11. See, e.g., Rydde v. Morris, 675 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2009) (“Having relaxed
the traditional privity requirement in legal malpractice claims, [we]
nevertheless draw the line and refuse for compelling policy reasons to permit a
malpractice claim by a non-client for negligent failure to draft a will.”). One
major difference is that the reform doctrines apply regardless of whether an
attorney is involved, while malpractice claims only involve attorney-drafted
wills, so the policy of protecting lawyers is implicit in some of the limitations on
malpractice claims. For example, there is a concern that lawyers liable to
disappointed beneficiaries will experience a conflict of interest with divided
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offer another illustration of how bright-line rules do not
necessarily achieve dispository intent, although the privity rules
do achieve certainty on only allowing final dispository statements
(that are incomplete or show a lack of resolution) to provide a
basis for a malpractice action.
A malpractice claim typically requires: (1) the existence of an
attorney-client relationship (privity); (2) a duty to use such skill,
prudence, and diligence as other attorneys commonly possess and
exercise; (3) the attorney’s breach of duty; and (4) damage to the
client. The traditional rule was that attorneys owed duties only to
their clients; third party potential beneficiaries could not bring
suits against a drafting attorney. Strict privity began to crumble,
however, during the second half of the twentieth century,12 with
most states willing to relax the privity bar at least in some
circumstances so that the estate or a disappointed beneficiary can
sue an attorney for malpractice.13 Notwithstanding a lack of
privity, courts have found a duty where the executed
testamentary document itself reflects the testator’s undisputed
intent that the plaintiff receive a specific benefit and that intent
is frustrated.14 In deciding whether to excuse privity, courts often
apply a balancing test that looks at the public interest.
loyalties, an issue not presented in the harmless error context. And, of course,
the issues concerning “Irresolute Testators” include cases both with and without
attorney involvement. The role of the attorney as mediator between the
testator’s actual intent and the ultimate product results in additional
uncertainty as to whether the error resulted from the testator’s lack of
decisiveness or the attorney’s malpractice. Nonetheless, the question of how far
to move beyond a traditional and confining law involving estate planning is
clearly presented.
12. See Hall v. Kalfayan, 190 Cal. App. 4th 927, 933 (Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]his
strict privity test was rejected in a trio of cases involving testamentary
instruments.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (“Duty of Care to Certain Nonclients”); Daniel R. Nappier, Note, Blurred Lines:
Analyzing an Attorney's Duties to A Fiduciary-Client's Beneficiaries, 71 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 2609, 2621 (2014) (“Many . . . cases have concluded that a fiduciary’s attorney does
owe duties to beneficiaries.”).
13. See Martin D. Begleiter, The Gambler Breaks Even: Legal Malpractice
in Complicated Estate Planning Cases, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 277, 281–82 (2003)
(describing approaches taken by states regarding privity); Gerry W. Beyer,
Avoid Being A Defendant: Estate Planning Malpractice and Ethical Concerns, 5
ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 224, 232 (2015) (same); Karen J. Sneddon,
Speaking for the Dead: Voice in Last Wills and Testaments, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
683, 714 (2011) (same).
14. See Paul v. Patton, 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830, 837 (2015) (citing cases
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By contrast, courts have resolutely refused to relax the
privity bar when it comes to non-execution, holding that “an
attorney owes no duty of care to an intended will beneficiary to
have the will executed promptly” or even at all.15 That is, in the
absence of a valid will, courts find no duty. For example, in a
1995 California case, Mary Ann Borina’s will provided for trust
income to her husband and sister.16 She met with an attorney to
discuss a new will under which her husband would receive all of
the trust income.17 Once the attorney delivered a rough draft of
the new will to Borina for review, she told him she needed to
discuss the revised estate plan with her sister before finalizing
the new will.18 Borina died six months later, with the new will
unexecuted.19 The court found that there was no duty to the
husband, the beneficiary of the new, but unexecuted, will.20 These
cases do seem to involve the irresolute testator of Baron’s title.
But, of course, they also illustrate that privity is more likely than
not to be a bar when the testator “conform[s] to the paradigm”21
and there actually is a will; this conformity, Baron suggests, “is
more important to the outcome of these cases than the
evidentiary standard.”22 Or, in Sisson v. Jankowski,23 the
decedent did not want to die intestate, and the court
acknowledged that “the unexecuted will accurately expressed his
intent to pass his entire estate to the plaintiff.”24 Nonetheless, the
will remained unexecuted because of a minor change in
contingent beneficiaries.25
reflecting the view “that the testator’s intent is central to the duty analysis”).
15. Parks v. Fink, 293 P.3d 1275, 1281 (Wa. 2013); see also Riso v. Dwyer,
No. 2015-0361, 2016 WL 1069068, at *3 (N.H. Mar. 18, 2016) (concluding that
because there was still a “potential for conflict as to who [the testator’s]
beneficiary would be,” the attorney defendants “did not owe a duty to the
plaintiffs”).
16. Radovich v. Locke-Paddon, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 574 (Ct. App. 1995).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 575.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 584.
21. Baron, supra note 1, at 55
22. Id.
23. 809 A.2d 1265 (N.H. 2002).
24. Id. at 1266.
25. See id. at 1266 (noting that, “rather than modifying the will

INCOMPLETE DISPOSITIONS

265

This stringent line in cases where a will has not actually
been executed for malpractice purposes is not echoed in the
existing harmless error cases that Baron discusses. In those
reform cases in her article, courts are willing to admit to probate
improperly executed wills or arguably not final statements of
intention designed to constitute a will. And it is those cases which
Baron suggests function to stretch the reform doctrines beyond
where they may have been intended to go. Wills law reforms, as
Baron’s article argues, are designed to save the testator who has
an undisputed intent. Thus, it is not surprising that courts
reforming privity doctrine would draw a similar distinction
between testators who clearly had reached a finalized intent, as
evidenced by an executed will, and those who might in fact have
reached a finalized intent, but did not have the executed will as
evidence of their resoluteness.
In titling her article Irresolute Testators, Baron suggests that
the decedents were not entirely certain of their dispository
wishes. In some of the cases, that is undoubtedly true. Indeed,
the problem is sometimes hesitancy about particular outcomes
(the need to discuss a will change with a sister). Nonetheless, in
others, there seems strong—sometimes beyond a reasonable
doubt—evidence of the testator’s intent. It often appears to be
just plain old lawyer failure (leaving a residuary clause
unfinished in Herceg). Yes, Charles Kuralt was sophisticated, but
did he really understand that a typed will would supersede an
earlier holographic will?26 Similarly, in the unexecuted wills
cases, where courts are unwilling to relax the privity bar to
consider malpractice claims, there is sometimes quite reasonable
doubt that the decedents intended the draft writings to become
final testamentary statements or even uncertainty that the
documents contained those wishes; yet there are also cases where

immediately
to
include
a
hand-written
contingent
beneficiary
clause . . . Attorney Jankowski left without obtaining the decedent’s signature to
the will”).
26. Baron
notes
that
Kuralt
did
not
involve
substantial
compliance/harmless error. For further discussion of how nonlawyers
understand the law, see generally Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making
Things Fair”: An Empirical Study of How People Approach the Wealth
Transmission System, 22 ELDER L.J. 325 (2015).
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it was the lawyer’s failure to translate wishes into written
certainty (the Sisson decedent did not want to die intestate).
Consequently, rather than labeling the tension as one
between differing testator selves who are “rational” and
“irresolute,”27 we might instead conceptualize the sometimes
contradictory trends as tensions between whether to apply rules
versus standards,28 as well as between the complete versus the
incomplete. That is, the cases often involve decedents who have
made final choices, but have, at least arguably, not adequately
documented their choices. They are not—or at least frequently
are not—irresolute. They had specific goals. Louise Macool knew
what she wanted, but her lawyer may have felt irresolute about
whether he knew what she wanted; Kuralt apparently did not
realize the nature of his illness, or he would have called in the
lawyers before writing the document that (ultimately) qualified
as a holographic will. Or, the post-will execution savings
doctrines of ademption and antilapse protect against a failure to
anticipate contingencies; the testator might well have intended to
allow descendants of the original devisee to inherit something,
but simply did not contemplate a sale of a specific item or the
death of the original devisee. The intentions may be final and
decisive, but not enough planning occurred, the wrong questions
were asked, or the wrong legal formalities were followed. The
two—resolute and irresolute testator—are, in fact, ends on a
continuum of dispository wishes that is often defined by lawyer
competence.29
27. Irresolute means feeling hesitant, uncertain. Interestingly, women
appear somewhat more likely than men to use precatory (non-directive) words
in their wills. See Alyssa A. DiRusso, He Says, She Asks: Gender, Language, and
the Law of Precatory Words in Wills, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 38–39 (2007)
(discussing an empirical research showing that “sex explains roughly 1.7% of
the variability in precatory language”); Karen J. Sneddon, Not Your Mother's
Will: Gender, Language, and Wills, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1535, 1567 (2015)
(“Because precatory language and expressive language appear to be included
more in the Wills of women than the Wills of men, the use may reflect the
perpetuation of gender stereotypes about gender appropriate language or could
be a legacy of testamentary access or a combination of both.”).
28. See Baron, supra note 1, at 73; see also Daniel B. Kelly, Toward
Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 855,
872 (2012) (“[R]ules entail more predictability and consistency than
standards.”).
29. As Baron states,
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Whether the testators are actually irresolute or their final
dispository wishes are definitive but—based on the requisite
formalities—incompletely articulated, ultimately, Baron calls
attention to the larger issues of the sometimes paradoxical
manner in which the legal system approaches dispository intent.
Wills law has, for centuries, attempted to establish two distinct
categories, the intestate decedent and the rational testator. The
irresolute, or (my preferred term) the incomplete, testator adds
another significant dimension altogether that, moving forward,
challenges existing wills doctrine.30
Bright-line rules and neat categories are appealing; they
make decisions easy. And, when a will falls into the safe harbor
that Baron identifies, the decision is easy. Or, when there is no
writing, intestacy serves as a similar safe harbor.31 Tantalizingly,
the article does not suggest how the law might more
appropriately balance these two “selves”—should we, for example,
move towards recognizing final statements of intent, even if there
is no clear and convincing evidence of compliance with the Wills
Act?32 In a world of increasingly common nonprobate transfers,
I do not wish to overdraw the comparison between the two
testamentary selves. It is surely not the case that some people are
entirely rational in the traditional, choosing sense, while others
experience only the bounded rationality of the erring testator. Nor is
it true that careful, self-reliant testators will never make mistakes,
while less careful testators will always make them.
Baron, supra note 1, at 73.
30. Id.
31. That is not to say that a valid will may not be challenged, or that
intestacy is easy. See generally SUSAN GARY, JEROME BORISON, NAOMI CAHN &
PAULA MONOPOLI, CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO TRUSTS AND ESTATES (2d ed.
2014) (discussing challenges of intestacy and will contests); Carly McKeeman, ‘I
Never Meant to Cause You Any Sorrow’—Lessons from Prince on Intestacy, ABA
(May 9, 2016), http://abaforlawstudents.com/2016/05/09/never-meant-causesorrow-lessons-prince-intestacy/ (last visited June 30, 2016) (noting the
potential heirs to Prince’s fortune along with the estate tax consequences of the
lack of planning) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Maria
Puente, “Heirs” to Prince’s Millions are Multiplying, USA TODAY (Jun 16, 2016),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/music/2016/06/14/would--heirs-princesmillions-multiplying/85891872/ (last visited June 30, 2016) (detailing the
complexities of determining heirs to the singer, Prince) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
32. See generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the
Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
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what role, after all, does the safe harbor of wills, with its
ritualized formalities, still serve? By suggesting the need to ask
these questions that are fundamental to trusts and estates,
Baron goes far in moving the law towards recognition, if not
reconciliation, of the differing testamentary selves.

